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This project analyzes the concept of vulnerability and the way that it is applied as a label 
in the context of human subject research.  Vulnerability as a concept represents concern for an 
individual’s or group’s acute inability to protect her or their own interests.  In the research 
context, this concept is applied as a label across large populations in an attempt to signify a need 
for added protections when these populations are enrolled in research because of the heightened 
susceptibility of these groups to harms, wrongs, or exploitation.  Although there are legitimate 
reasons for extending heightened protections to particular individuals, the way the concept is 
currently applied in the research context fails to protect all those who are in need of protections, 
and furthermore, causes harm or wrongs individuals and those populations so-termed 
‘vulnerable’.  The label is too broad, and tends to extend protections to those who are not in need 
of them to their potential detriment.  Furthermore, the label fails to draw attention to the manner 
in which these groups are vulnerable and thus appropriate and adequate protections may not be 
offered.  The label of ‘vulnerability’ can also carry with it a stigma, which may be internalized 
by members of these vulnerable populations.  Instead of conceptualizing vulnerability as an 
individual’s or group’s inability to protect her or their own interests due to some feature of those 
so labeled, vulnerability should be conceptualized in a way that does not obscure the relational 
features of the concept – i.e., that the type of vulnerability of interest in research frequently is the 
result of relationships of power, and research protections should adopt a framework based on 
such a conceptualization.  The focus ought to be on those features or situational characteristics 
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 v 
that are likely to override an individual’s assertion of her own interests.  This approach would 
avoid the situating of the inability to protect one’s own interests within the individual, and would 
allow for a practical enactment of protections which serve everyone equally when they are in 
situations of experiencing vulnerability in relation to a particular other or institution. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Vulnerability is a concept that denotes a concern for an individual’s inability to protect 
her own interests.  Generally, in everyday language, vulnerability is a weakness.  It indicates a 
heightened susceptibility to being harmed or wronged.  The concept of vulnerability is frequently 
employed in human subject research.  Populations which are particularly prone to being harmed 
or wronged for a number of varying reasons are named as vulnerable in research guidelines and 
in other literature surrounding the protection of human research subjects.  These populations are 
identified so that special protections can be put into place regarding their enrollment and 
participation in research.  These special protections can take varying forms, and they are directed 
at compensating for the particular susceptibility of these vulnerable populations. 
In this work, I will argue that the way the concept of vulnerability is used in the research 
ethics context is not as useful and appropriate as possible.  Although there are circumstances 
under which special protections may be justified, the categorization of broad populations as 
vulnerable risks causing a number of harms both practical and conceptual.  A central concern of 
this project is well framed by Martha Minow who asks, “When does treating people differently 
emphasize their difference and stigmatize and hinder them on that basis, and when does treating 
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people the same become insensitive to their differences and likely to stigmatize or hinder them 
on that basis?”1   
I will argue that because the concept of vulnerability is insufficiently sensitive and 
specific, it fails to pick out those and only those who are in need of special protections.  I will 
also argue that the label of vulnerability can stigmatize those who are labeled as such, and further 
that they may harmfully internalize that stigma.  Finally, I argue that the concept of vulnerability 
fails to draw attention to the reason that individuals or populations are vulnerable, and that it 
therefore does not serve to initiate an attempt to address these underlying problems but rather 
focuses the attention on solutions which impact the vulnerable individual.  At the same time, it is 
true that some people are susceptible to being harmed or wronged to a greater degree than others, 
and bioethics ought to be concerned with identifying and preventing these harms and wrongs.  
Therefore, ultimately, I will propose a way in which vulnerability ought to be conceptualized 
which would allow special protections to be put into place to protect individuals who are at an 
increased risk of experiencing harms, wrongs, or exploitation but which will not either force a 
label on individuals who are not at risk or further wrong individuals who are. 
In the first of the sections that follow, I will describe the concept of vulnerability and 
explore how it is used in the regulation and guidance of research with human subjects.  Then, the 
next section will articulate how current use of the concept in research fails to promote the goals 
of protecting so-called vulnerable populations from harms, wrongs, or exploitation.  I will argue 
that, in fact, such use may cause additional harms to these already (potentially) vulnerable 
individuals.  Finally, section four will discuss how vulnerability may be reconceptualized in a 
way that would avoid the harms and stigmatization which are presented by the current schema 
                                                 
1 Minow, Martha. Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law. (Cornell  
University Press, 1991): 20. 
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for implementing special protections.  In reconceptualizing vulnerability, special protections can 
be offered that would both be more effective at combating harms and wrongs that may result 
from research participation and avoid the harmful implications and stigmatization which are 
attendant in the way that the concept and label are currently applied.      
 4 
2.0   ‘VULNERABILITY’ 
 
 The term ‘vulnerability’ is frequently used in the areas of research ethics and research 
regulation.  For instance, the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ Office 
for Human Research Protections (OHRP) lays out defined groups of vulnerable populations 
subject to various special protections in the research setting.  The label is intended to heighten 
awareness of particular individuals’ or groups’ susceptibility to harms or wrongs and also to 
trigger special protections of their interests and rights.  In general, vulnerability is a very 
expansive concept used to signify varying types of weaknesses arising from different 
characteristics – physical or situational.  “[T]he root of the concept of vulnerability lies in the 
possibility of physical harm.  The term derives from the Latin vulnus (wound).  In ordinary 
language, ‘vulnerable’ means ‘capable of being attacked, harmed, or injured in some way.’”2   
There are ways in which someone may be vulnerable which are ethically significant, as 
well as ways which are not of any ethical concern.  Certain individuals, for instance, might be 
described as particularly “vulnerable to the flu.”  Although the term ‘vulnerable’ is being used in 
accordance with the above definition, the way in which the individual is capable of or susceptible 
to suffering such harm is not in itself morally relevant.  In the morally relevant sense, the term 
                                                 
2 Levine, Carol, et al. "The Limitations of "Vulnerability" as a Protection for Human Research  
Participants." American Journal of Bioethics 4, no. 3 (2004): 47. 
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‘vulnerable’ is used to note a susceptibility to being wronged or taken advantage of, or a 
heightened susceptibility which is the result of the relationship between a characteristic of an 
individual (e.g., being particularly susceptible to the flu) and the conditions present in the 
research context (e.g., being required to visit a clinic numerous times during flu season).  The 
concept represents a concern for an individual’s or population’s lack of the usual level of ability 
to safeguard her or their own interests.   
 The recognition of a population as vulnerable may denote a number of ethical concerns.  
The need for special protections is invoked in cases where the individual or population is 
particularly susceptible to being harmed, exploited, or wronged (in ways other than exploitation).  
There are various characteristics which might cause individuals particularly “capable” of being 
harmed, exploited, or wronged – i.e., characteristics that make them vulnerable.  Sometimes, as 
will be examined more fully below, the characteristics are features of the individual’s external 
environment (e.g., impoverishment, lack of political power), and sometimes the characteristics 
are features of the individual herself (e.g., suffering a traumatic brain injury, being pregnant); 
furthermore, the characteristics can be more or less malleable (e.g., being a minor, suffering 
irreversible brain damage). 
 In research regulations, vulnerable categories of people are identified, and special 
limitations on their enrollment or conditions of their participation in research are imposed.3  
These categories identify groups of individuals who are believed to have limited decision-
making capacity (e.g., cognitively impaired persons), to experience constraints on the 
voluntariness of their choices (e.g., prisoners), or to face harms of greater magnitude or 
probability than others as a result of participation in research (e.g., the greater harm that a person 
                                                 
3 Coleman, Carl H. "Vulnerability as a Regulatory Category in Human Subject Research." Journal of Law, Medicine 
and Ethics 37, no. 1 (2009): 12. 
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with a stigmatizing health condition may suffer if the confidentiality of research records were 
breached).4  Special protections, then, are designed to identify and compensate for these 
limitations in order to ensure that these individuals are enrolled in research only when their 
decisions to participate were truly voluntary, informed, and competently made, and that there are 
heightened protections considered that would compensate for the higher frequency or severity of 
harms experienced by certain populations.   
2.1 VULNERABILITY AS A CONCEPT AND ITS USES 
 The concept of vulnerability is employed to signify an individual’s or a population’s 
susceptibility to being harmed or wronged.5  The term vulnerability has appeared with a different 
significance than the one that is considered in this paper; that is, vulnerability has been noted by 
                                                 
4 Office of Protection From Research Risks (OPRR). Institutional Review Board Guidebook (1993), Chapter VI: 
Special Classes of Subjects, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_chapter6.htm (last visited April 1, 
2011).;  The details of the Guidebook’s origins will be covered in a later section.  For now it will suffice to say that a 
rendition of the Guidebook was first developed in the early 1980’s under contract by the President’s Commission for 
the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research to help IRB members 
understand the principles and regulations that applied to research with human subjects.  Id., at Forward.  A second 
version was prepared by the Office of Protection of Research Risks and Robin Levin Penslar, editor.  Id.  This 
version was last updated in 1993, and the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) indicates on its copy 
published to the internet: “Developments over the intervening years have made portions of the Guidebook 
information obsolete, while portions of the information remain valid.  There is no errata document to indicate which 
information has been superseded.  OHRP cautions users to verify the current validity of any Guidebook information 
before relying on the information in a program of human subjects protection.”  Id.  The Guidebook’s section on 
“Special Classes of Subjects” is consistent with the current status of research regulations; and thus remains a 
relevant source of information on review of study protocols which involve vulnerable subjects. 
5 See, e.g., Kipnis, Kenneth. "Vulnerability in Research Subjects: An Analytical Approach." In The  
Variables of Moral Capacity, edited by David C. Thomasma and David N. Weisstub, 217-231. Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2004.; “By definition, it is a distinctive precariousness in the condition of the subject: a state of being 
laid open to or especially exposed to something injurious or otherwise undesirable.  A vulnerability is, so to speak, 
an avenue of attack.”, Id. at 220.; see also, World Health Organization, Health Dimensions of Economic Reform 
(1992) available at http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1991/57259_(part1).pdf (last visited April 18, 2011): 11.; “The 
concept of vulnerability has been widely used to denote a condition in which the physical and mental will-being 
required for a normal productive life is impaired and at constant risk.  However, vulnerability in general usage 
includes any condition of exposure to hazards, risks and stresses.”  Id. 
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various thinkers to be an essential characteristic of the human condition.6  Vulnerability in that 
broader sense signifies the human condition of being mortal, imperfect, dependent, capable of 
being harmed.7  The concept of vulnerability, however, is more commonly used and thought of 
to signify a more narrow subset of individuals – those who are particularly prone to being 
harmed or wronged.  This concept singles out those who are “more deeply, variably and 
selectively vulnerable to the action of particular others and the particular institutions on whom 
[they] come to depend for specific and often unavoidable purposes.”8   
 In research regulations, the condition of vulnerability is ascribed to those groups who 
exhibit the diminished or complete lack of capacity to consent, dependence, or inequitable access 
to power or resources.9  “Vulnerable persons are those who are relatively (or absolutely) 
incapable of protecting their own interests.  More formally, they may have insufficient power, 
intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes to protect their own 
interests.”10  The concern for vulnerable populations, then, is their lack of ability – which may 
stem from incapacity, lack of power, or other characteristics – to ensure the protection of their 
own interests. 
 The term vulnerable is used in reference to individuals or groups who are particularly 
prone to being harmed or wronged because of: (1) a lack of decision-making capacity, (2) a 
particular inability to make a voluntary decision, or (3) a heightened rate or severity of harms 
which may befall that individual or group by her or their participation in research.  The first two 
                                                 
6 See Kottow, Michael H. "Vulnerability: What Kind of Principle Is It?" Medicine, Health Care, and Philosophy 7 
(2004): 281-287., for a discussion on this point. 
7 See, Id., at 282-3., citing the works of Hobbes, Mills, MacIntyre and Heidegger. 
8 O'Neill, Onora. Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning. 2nd prtg. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1998): 192. 
9 Levine, supra note 2, at 45. 
10 Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS). "International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects." 2002, available at 
http://www.cioms.ch/publications/layout_guide2002.pdf (last visited April 1, 2011). 
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uses refer to ways in which an individual’s or group’s decision-making power – a power which 
would serve to protect the individual’s or group’s interests – can be undermined so that they may 
be rendered particularly susceptible to being harmed or wronged.  Vulnerable individuals or 
groups may be particularly susceptible either because they lack competence for any number of 
reasons, or because they may be particularly subject to undue pressure which would render their 
decision involuntary.  Cognitively impaired individuals, for instance, are considered vulnerable.  
The label ‘vulnerable’ is applied to cognitively impaired individuals because of a particular 
characteristic – namely, a lack of cognitive ability which renders them susceptible to being 
physically harmed or taken advantage of.  Minors constitute another group which is generally 
considered vulnerable because of their lack of competence.   
An individual or population may also be labeled ‘vulnerable’ in instances in which undue 
pressure may be exerted on their decision-making in spite of their competence.  For instance, 
prisoners are considered a vulnerable population within the research context because of their 
circumstances, not a lack of cognitive ability.11  They are particularly susceptible to being 
harmed or wronged because they are wards of an institution and can easily be subject to undue 
pressures which undermine their ability to make informed, voluntary decisions.  Students are 
another example of a population which might be considered vulnerable in a decision-making 
context because of the overwhelming potential for undue influence to be exerted and for their 
decision-making powers to be undercut. 
Individuals may also be vulnerable in a sense that is not connected to decision-making 
ability – namely, by being particularly susceptible to harms which may result from the conduct 
                                                 
11 At least not typically; set aside any arguments or evidence that incarcerated individuals typically have a lower 
socioeconomic status or education level.  When prisoners are identified as a vulnerable population, the concerns are 
most typically about their status as institutionalized individuals. 
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of research (either normal research procedures or failures of research protections).  Harms may 
befall them at a greater rate or they, in particular, may be exposed to more devastating harms 
than other individuals or groups.  In short, certain populations or individuals can be particularly 
susceptible to harms which are a result of features encountered in the research process.  Research 
involves the collection of data about individuals, sometimes sensitive medical information or 
other personal information.  If a breach of confidentiality were to occur, some groups or 
populations may be harmed more gravely than others.  For instance, HIV-positive individuals 
can constitute a vulnerable population because they would be much more gravely harmed by a 
breach of their medical data which identifies them as such than their HIV-negative counterparts, 
who would be unlikely to suffer any effect from a breach of information regarding their HIV 
status.  Breaches of confidentiality may also affect individuals with as yet unexpressed genetic 
conditions more severely than those not at genetically increased risk, because they may be 
discriminated against in employment or in acquiring life insurance or may be stereotyped by 
others who may express their attitudes or opinions in harmful ways.  These groups are more 
susceptible to being harmed or wronged by participation in research because particular adverse 
events which may occur would tend to harm them with more frequency or severity than others 
who don’t share that particular characteristic. 
In addition to different sources of vulnerability, an individual or group can be thought to 
be susceptible to different sorts of negative outcomes: (1) harms, (2) wrongs, or (3) exploitation.  
Although exploitation is actually a subset in the category of “wrongs,” I will address it as its own 
category in this work because it is a particularly relevant and overwhelming concern which 
drives the need for the research protections and the use of the ‘vulnerable’ label in that context. 
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Prevention of harm is a major goal of bioethics, but what is meant by ‘harm’ is not 
always clearly defined.  In this paper, the term ‘harm’ will be used in what has been described as 
its “ordinary language” sense; that is: “Ordinary language tends to distinguish between being 
harmed (in the broad sense of suffering an adverse effect, or the unreasonable risk of such an 
effect, on one’s self- interest) and being wronged, that is having one’s rights violated.”12  To be 
harmed is to be made worse-off.  ‘Harms,’ for our purposes, will mean events which have an 
adverse effect on one’s interests, but that do not necessarily violate one’s rights.   
Wrongs are actions which constitute a violation of an individual’s rights, and are morally-
relevant.13  Wrongs frequently, but do not necessarily, make one worse-off.  Harms and wrongs 
can thus occur independently (i.e., there can be harms that aren’t wrongs, and vice versa), but 
they may also co-occur.  There are many common examples of things that are harms but not 
wrongs, such as becoming ill from a virus, losing one’s personal possessions in a natural disaster, 
or feeling mental displeasure at witnessing a gruesome traffic accident.14  Although examples of 
wrongs that are not harms are harder to come by, they do exist.  Someone who is (wrongly) lied 
to and thus modifies his behaviors but in a way that ultimately promotes his interests has 
experienced a wrong but not a harm.  If you lie to me and tell me you like my dress, I may be 
wronged by being told a lie, but ultimately I am not harmed because it is not meaningfully 
adverse to my interests for you to dislike my dress, and further I may get a feeling of happiness 
or pleasure at thinking you do like it.   
Instances of exploitation constitute a subset of wrongs, specifically those wrongs that 
involve taking advantage of another through an unfair agreement.  Research tends to create 
                                                 
12 Feinberg, Joel. "Harm and Offense." In Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. 
Becker. New York: Routledge, 2001. 
13 Id.. 
14 Id. 
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concern about the exploitation of individuals, because research involves placing some people at 
risk for the benefit of others.15  Because prevention of exploitation is a primary goal of the use of 
the ‘vulnerability’ label, it is important to have a detailed understanding of exploitation.  
According to Alan Wertheimer, exploitation involves three elements: (1) individuals who are 
exploited suffer some detriment or negative effect in an agreement (2) in which another gains, 
and (3) there is some defect or unfairness in the process by which the agreement took place.16  
Exploitation does not always require that a harm result to the individual who is exploited; the 
person being exploited can, in fact, be made better off by the exploitative agreement.17  
Exploitation, on this view, takes an “all-things-considered” approach to considering an 
individual’s interests and determining whether or not she suffers a detriment or negative effect as 
part of an agreement.18  An individual may suffer a wrong in an agreement when both parties 
gain (in contrast to their status if there is no agreement), but the proportion of the exploitee’s 
gain is unfair compared to that of the exploiter.19   
For instance, suppose that B is stranded on a deserted road (without a cell phone) in the 
middle of the night.  Suppose that A drives by, notices B, and stops to see if B needs help.  A 
offers B a ride back to town (15 miles away), but only if B agrees to pay A $200.  A is driving 
the only car that has passed B in the matter of a two hour time frame, and B fears that if she does 
not accept A’s offer it will be many more hours until someone else comes by.  Reluctantly, B 
agrees to pay A for the ride.  In this situation, B gains from the transaction.  She gets a ride back 
to town and is no longer stranded.  However, she suffers a wrong because she pays too high a 
                                                 
15 Emanuel, Ezekiel, David Wendler, and Christine Grady. "What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?" Journal of the 
American Medical Association 283 (2000): 2701. 
16 Wertheimer, Alan. Exploitation. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996): 34. 
17 Id., at 18-28. 
18 Id., at 19. 
19 Id., at 21-22. 
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price for what she gains.  The transaction was exploitative despite the fact that B is made better 
off by no longer being stranded.  B gains, but disproportionately to what she pays, and A gains, 
but the transaction was unfair.  Therefore, although B did not suffer a harm, she was wronged by 
being exploited in this particular agreement.  Individuals are wronged when they are exploited 
because they are taken advantage of in an unfair transaction.20   
Research protections need to address concerns about exploitation because the research 
context necessarily involves a situation that presents the risk of exploitation.  In research, (1) an 
individual is put at risk via an agreement to participate in research, (2) in which the agreement is 
designed primarily to afford potential benefit to another party (e.g., society through the increase 
of knowledge, or future patients through development of improved medical interventions.  
Individuals participate in research and thus assume certain risks, while the benefits of the 
research are not meant to accrue to those participating in the research, but rather to society as a 
whole.21   What is critical is to ensure that the agreement to participate is not exploitative or does 
not take unfair advantage of participants. 
The concept of vulnerability is designed to recognize individuals that are particularly 
prone to being harmed, wronged, or exploited and to draw attention to the conditions which 
render them vulnerable.  It signifies concern about an individual’s ability to protect her own 
interests.  In the next section, the concept of vulnerability as situated within the context of 
research protections will be extensively explored. 
                                                 
20 Wertheimer, supra note 16, at 34. 
21 Benefits that do accrue to research participants may be accidental, and are not part of the study design.    
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2.2 THE REGULATION OF RESEARCH AND THE CONCEPT OF 
VULNERABILITY 
 Oversight of research and research regulations emerged in the 20th century in the light of 
major human subject abuses and highly publicized tragedies which occurred in the course of 
research studies involving human participants.22  The protections which apply to human research 
subjects come from a variety of sources and have materialized slowly over time.  Although there 
were sporadic protections in place prior to the period following World War II,23 the “Doctors’ 
Trial” of 1947 marked the start of a more regular flurry of regulations applicable to research 
conduct.  After the “Doctors’ Trial”24, in which 23 doctors and administrators in the Nazi regime 
were tried for their participation in highly unethical, disturbing, and torturous medical 
experiments on humans, the Nuremberg Code was developed to prevent similar abuses from 
happening in the future.25  The Nuremberg Code, although never officially incorporated into 
American law, is generally considered the foundation for the research ethics guidelines and 
regulations that are in place today.  In 1964, the World Medical Association (WMA) issued the 
Declaration of Helsinki which broadened the ethical obligations which attached to physicians to 
the area of research involving human participants.26   
                                                 
22 For an excellent, and much more comprehensive than is presented here, look at the development of regulations for 
human research subjects protections and the historical context in which they were developed, see Faden, Ruth R., 
and Tom L. Beauchamp. A History and Theory of Informed Consent. Oxford University Press, 1986., in particular, 
chapters 5 and 6.   
23 See, Berg, Jessica W., Paul S. Appelbaum, Lisa S. Parker, and Charles W. Lidz. Informed Consent: Legal Theory 
and Clinical Practice. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001., for an excellent timeline beginning with a 
research scandal in Prussia in the 1890s which sparked government-mandated consent obtainment for research. 
24 US v. Karl Brandt, et al. (1947). 
25 Heimer, Carol A., and JuLeigh Petty. "Bureaucratic Ethics: IRBs and the Legal Regulation of Human Subjects 
Research." Annual Review of Law and Social Science 6 (2010): 602. 
26 The Declaration of Helsinki, available at http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/b3/17c.htm (last 
visited April 1, 2011).  
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Because of the continued abuses of human research subjects in the United States,27 the 
National Research Act28 was enacted in 1974.  The Act created the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research in the Department of 
Health and Human Services.29  The Commission worked for four years to develop a set of ethical 
principles to guide researchers in the biomedical and behavioral sciences conducting studies with 
human subjects, officially titled “Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research,” but most commonly referred to as the “Belmont Report.”30  The three 
principles named by the Report are respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.31  Although this 
report was issued merely as guidance and was based on ethical principles, the principles 
influenced the Common Rule,32 which is enforceable and requires all research funded by the 
                                                 
27 The most infamous of these abuses are probably the 1932-1972 Tuskegee study of untreated syphilis among poor 
black men and the 1963-1966 study in which students with mental retardation at the Willowbrook State School were 
injected with hepatitis as a condition for their admission for research purposes. See, Heimer and Petty, supra note 
25, at 602. 
28 Public Law 93-348. 
29 Id. 
30 National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. "Ethical 
Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research ("The Belmont Report")." 1979, 
available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/belmont.html (last visited April 1, 2011). 
31 Id. 
32 45 C.F.R. §46, Subpart A.; Chapter 45, section 46 of the Code of Federal Regulations was drafted as the 
regulation governing research conducted or funded by the Department of Health and Human Services.  By 1991, 15 
federal agencies in total adopted Subpart A of these regulations to govern research studies involving human subjects, 
and so it became known as the “Common Rule.”  See, e.g., Heimer & Petty, supra note 25, at 602.; Emanuel, 
Ezekiel, et al., “Oversight of Human Participants Research: Identifying Problems to Evaluate Reform Proposals” 
Annals of Internal Medicine 141 (2004): 282.;  The agencies were free to adopt any or all (or none) of the subparts 
of 45 C.F.R. §46, but the majority have only adopted subpart A.  Some agencies, such as the Department of 
Education (at 34 C.F.R. §97) have chosen to adopt other subparts of 45 C.F.R. §46 in addition to subpart A; the 
Department of Education has incorporated subpart D pertaining to special protections for research involving 
children.  Other agencies have adopted the Common Rule, and also incorporated additional protections but using 
their own, independently-worded provisions (see, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §26, which are the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s regulations regarding research involving human subjects.  They have instituted additional protections for 
research involving children and pregnant women, but they have drafted their own regulations.).  
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particular federal agencies that adopted the regulations which require studies involving human 
participants to be subject to review by an Institutional Review Board (IRB).33  
Institutional review boards (IRBs) are the organizations charged with protecting human 
research subjects from harm; and they do so by reviewing proposed research and approving, 
requesting modification of, or disapproving research protocols in light of the complex 
regulations set forth in the Common Rule.34  The regulations require that IRBs review and 
approve studies to ensure that their design follows the ethical principles before individuals are 
enrolled.  IRBs are also charged with oversight of the ethical conduct of the study as it 
proceeds.35  Although the Common Rule specifically charges IRBs with ethical review 
responsibilities, IRBs are largely left to interpret the regulations and to determine what criteria to 
consider and whether or not proposed studies fulfill the regulations and the Belmont principles.  
There is an abundance of literature on most aspects of research ethics and research review which 
might guide IRB members in their ethical analysis of proposed research.  
An influential article in the research ethics literature examines seven requirements which 
could serve as a framework for determining whether or not a particular study protocol is in 
conformity with the guiding ethical principles generally recognized by the documents which 
govern human subject research.36  The proposed study must: (1) be of social or scientific value; 
(2) conform to accepted standards for ensuring scientific validity; (3) provide for fair subject 
selection; (4) exhibit a favorable risk-benefit ratio; (5) be subject to independent review; (6) 
require the acquisition of informed consent; and (7) exhibit respect for potential and enrolled 
                                                 
33 “Protection of Human Subjects,” 45 C.F.R. §46 (2005).; In 1991, 15 federal agencies in total adopted 45 C.F.R. 
§46, subpart A, to govern research studies involving human subjects, and because of its widespread adoption, it has 
become known as the Common Rule. 
34 Maschke, Karen J. "Human Research Protections: Time for Regulatory Reform?" Hastings Center Report 38, no. 
2 (2008): 20. 
35 45 C.F.R. §46.109.; see also Maschke, id. 
36 Emanuel, et al., supra note 15, at 2701. 
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subjects.37  The ethical values from which this framework was derived are: concern for a scarcity 
of resources, nonexploitation, justice, nonmaleficence, beneficence, public accountability, 
minimizing the influence of conflicts of interest, respect for autonomy, and respect for welfare.38  
Thus, the ethical framework which guides considerations of human subjects research is more 
robust than the three principles recognized by the Belmont Report, and it is this more exhaustive 
set of values which ultimately informs protection of human research subjects.   
Some research regulations39 and guidance provided to institutional review boards40 lay 
out a very particular list of populations which are considered vulnerable.  Eleven populations are 
considered vulnerable in the IRB Guidebook, a reference manual for IRBs, which incorporates 
the existing federal regulations with ethical considerations and offers IRB members a resource to 
consult when dealing with particularly difficult issues of ensuring the protection of human 
research subjects. The IRB Guidebook was drafted by the Department of Health and Human 
Services’ Office for Protection from Research Risks41 in consultation with numerous advisors to, 
as stated in the Preface, “provide precisely what its title is intended to denote: guidance. The 
Guidebook does not itself constitute regulations but rather has been prepared for the convenience 
and reference of IRB members and administrators”42   
Perhaps because human subject research regulations and guidelines developed as a 
response to grave harms and wrongs, they are crafted to recognize that there are particular 
circumstances in which some people may be particularly prone to being subjected to those harms 
                                                 
37 Emanuel, et al., supra note 15, at 2703. 
38 Id. 
39 “Protection of Human Subjects,” supra note 33. 
40 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Chapter VI: Special Classes of Subjects, supra note 4. 
41 The OPRR is the predecessor to the Office for Human Research Protections (OHRP) mentioned earlier.  The 
OHRP has accepted the findings regarding research regulations and guidance found in the materials published by the 
OPRR.  Office for Human Research Protections, “Policy and Guidance,” available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/policy (last visited April 18, 2011). 
42 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, supra note 4. 
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or wrongs, though the Guidebook does not focus on circumstances, but on groups of people.  
Chapter 6 of the Guidebook discusses protections for “Special Classes of Subjects.”43  The 
Preface states that this chapter “[p]rovides an analysis of the ethical issues that arise in research 
involving classes of particularly vulnerable research subjects.”44  It also makes reference to the 
fact that there are regulations in place for some of these “special classes of subjects,” but not for 
others.45  There are legal regulations in place governing the enrollment in research of “pregnant 
women, human fetuses and neonates,”46 “prisoners,”47 and “children.”48  However, the 
Guidebook recognizes that there are other classes of people who may be particularly vulnerable 
to harms or wrongs as research subjects and who could benefit from additional safeguards.  The 
eleven populations named in the Guidebook are – (1) fetuses and human in vitro fertilization; (2) 
women;49 (3) children and minors; (4) cognitively impaired persons; (5) prisoners; (6) 
traumatized and comatose patients; (7) terminally ill patients; (8) elderly/aged persons; (9) 
minorities; (10) students, employees, and normal volunteers; and (11) international research 
participants.50   
The Guidebook and the Common Rule provisions reflect concerns about some of these 
groups’ decision-making abilities, which are pertinent to enrollment decisions and informed 
                                                 
43 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Preface, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_preface.htm 
(last visited April 1, 2011). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 45 CFR §46, subpart B. 
47 45 CFR §46, subpart C. 
48 45 CFR §46, subpart D. 
49 The federal regulations (at 45 CFR §46) require special considerations be given to vulnerable subjects, and list 
only fetuses, pregnant women, human in vitro fertilization, prisoners, and children.  The IRB Guidebook, by 
contrast, recommends further populations which may warrant special consideration.  Under the heading “women,” 
the Guidebook does narrow its focus to “women who are or may become pregnant,” (Institutional Review 
Guidebook, supra note 4) and the special considerations are aimed at protecting the health of the (potential) fetus.  
The Guidebook does also make a note of the historic exclusion of all women from research, and (to the extent that it 
may safely be done) urges the inclusion of women within research subject populations so that they may benefit from 
the research findings as much as other populations.   
50 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Chapter VI: Special Classes of Subjects, supra note 4.  
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consent, and sometimes recognize concerns unrelated to decision-making – namely that harms 
may accrue to individuals under certain circumstances more often or more severely than to 
others.  Depending on the nature of the concern, the added safeguards may be implemented at 
any point in the research study process.  When an IRB reviews a research proposal, it does not 
only review consent forms; IRBs are responsible for reviewing the entire study protocol 
including information about the scientific validity of the study, the exact procedures being used, 
the anticipated benefits or findings, the study’s risk-benefit ratio, any advertisements for 
enrollment, eligibility and exclusion criteria, and subject recruitment procedures.  When a study 
is likely to involve the enrollment of members of one of the eleven designated groups, it is 
recommended that special safeguards be instituted, although the form of those safeguards varies.   
The ethical principle of respect for persons is exhibited by ensuring that autonomous 
individuals are treated as autonomous, and also that those who may lack the ability to make fully 
autonomous decisions have special protections put into place so that they are not used simply as 
a means to an end and so that their autonomy is respected to the extent possible.51  According to 
the Guidebook, respect for persons requires that individuals be asked to give informed consent to 
participate in research.  Informed consent has three elements: “information, comprehension, and 
voluntariness.”52  Individuals must be given enough information to make a voluntary, informed 
decision about research participation, including information about the study procedure, risks, any 
anticipated benefits, any alternative treatments available (if the study is therapeutic), and 
information about an individual’s ability to withdraw from the study.53  This information, 
secondly, must be given in a manner which the individual is able to understand, taking into 
                                                 
51 Belmont Report, supra note 30. 
52 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Introduction, available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/irb/irb_introduction.htm (last visited April 1, 2011). 
53 Id.  
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consideration any possible cognitive limitations and modifying the manner in which information 
provided accordingly.54  Finally, consent must be voluntarily given, which means it must be 
given under circumstances “free from coercion and undue influence.”55  
The Common Rule offers a more robust description of the legal requirements of informed 
consent.  Ultimately, the requirements can be distilled into eight basic elements: “(1) a statement 
that the study involves research, as well as a description of the research and its purposes; (2) a 
description of reasonably foreseeable risks; (3) a description of reasonably expected benefits; (4) 
disclosure of appropriate alternatives; (5) a statement about maintenance of confidentiality; (6) 
for research involving more than minimal risks, an explanation about possible compensation if 
injury occurs; (7) information about how the subject can have pertinent questions answered; and 
(8) a statement that participation is voluntary (i.e., that refusal to participate involves no penalties 
or loss of benefits).”56  In addition to this information, certain potential subjects should also be 
“given information regarding: (1) unforeseeable risks; (2) circumstances under which the 
subject’s participation will be terminated; (3) additional costs that the subject may incur; (4) the 
consequences of a subject’s decision to withdraw; (5) the dissemination of findings developed 
during the study that relate to a subject’s willingness to continue; and (6) the approximate 
number of total subjects.”57 
Sometimes the deficits which create concerns about being able to give voluntary, 
informed consent can be remedied, cured medically, or will resolve on their own.  Unintelligible 
consent forms, for instance, may be remedied and rendered intelligible by rewriting them at a 
reading level that allows individuals with low literacy or even cognitive impairment to 
                                                 
54 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Introduction, supra note 52. 
55 Id.; “IRBs should be especially sensitive to these factors when particularly vulnerable subjects are involved.” Id. 
56 Berg, et al., supra note 23, at 256. 
57 Id. 
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understand them.  A revised consent form could, in some instances (e.g., when enrolling persons 
with mild cognitive impairment), allow fulfillment of the information and comprehension 
requirements of informed consent.  Concerns about competence may in some cases be assuaged 
by understanding the cognitive level of these individuals and ensuring that they receive 
information about research participation in a manner which they understand and can use to make 
an informed decision, thus respecting their autonomy.  An individual whose competence 
fluctuates may be approached for enrollment only during periods where her competence is 
unhindered, or an individual with a mood disorder which may prevent her from fully considering 
her interests when making a decision could provide informed consent to enroll once medication 
restores her capacity to make a fully-considered decision.  
Concerns about undue pressure being exerted on prospective subjects might also be 
alleviated through the use of other safeguards in the enrollment process.  For instance, if the 
subject is being enrolled in a clinical study conducted by her professor, the study protocol may 
require that a third party present and explain the consent form as well as the information 
necessary for informed consent to the potential subject.  This third-party involvement may 
decrease the pressure which may be felt by the potential subject-student the subject would feel 
no pressure to oblige that disinterested third-party.  Another safeguard involves deciding where 
enrollment for the study will take place and advertisements will be placed.  By limiting the 
publicity of a study or its location, different populations may be attracted to participate.  If one 
concern about the study design is that the payment, while fairly scaled to the participation risks, 
may serve as an undue inducement to get certain economically disadvantaged populations to 
participate, one safeguard may be that the enrollment is scheduled to take place in a 
neighborhood not easily accessible to public transportation and thus less accessible to those 
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populations.  Another safeguard may be to limit the advertising mechanisms; perhaps no 
advertisements would be taken out in the free city paper or placed in neighborhood health clinics 
which tend to serve economically disadvantaged populations. 
Beneficence requires that when human subjects are involved, the risks of the research be 
minimized and the benefits be maximized.58  This principle is upheld by IRB members when 
they evaluate the scientific merit of proposed research and require both that the study have a 
solid scientific foundation and that it addresses a scientifically or socially valuable question (e.g., 
the potential to increase generalizable scientific knowledge or afford therapeutic benefit).  Study 
proposals must also show that the participation of human subjects is required to gain this 
knowledge, and when the study involves the enrollment of vulnerable populations, their 
participation must also be specifically justified.59   
Finally, the principle of justice requires that the benefits and burdens of research 
participation are distributed fairly across individuals and populations.60  Individuals must be 
chosen for participation fairly; they should not be enrolled because they are easily available or 
because the researcher feels they are less worthy as human beings and is thus more willing to 
impose the risks and burdens of research upon them.61  Furthermore, the principle of justice 
requires that some populations are enrolled in research only under certain conditions (e.g., 
prisoners may only be enrolled when the study is particularly aimed at ameliorating a condition 
particular to the prison population and has been reviewed by a prisoner advocate).62  This is a 
matter of justice because it ensures that, in reference to the given example, prisoners are enrolled 
                                                 
58 Belmont Report, supra note 30. 
59 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Introduction, supra note 52., “[T]he appropriateness of involving 
vulnerable populations must be demonstrated[.]”  Id. 
60 Belmont Report, supra note 30. 
61 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Introduction, supra note 52.  
62 Id.; see also 45 CFR §46, Subpart C. 
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in a study for which they as a population will receive maximal benefit and controls the amount of 
burden placed on them as a population.  It prevents researchers from seeking to enroll prisoners 
simply because they are an easily accessible population who are living under controlled 
conditions (e.g., controlled diet, controlled schedule), thus thrusting a large amount of research 
burdens on prisoners as a population, and not in proportion to their representative numbers in 
society. 
Vulnerability in the research context is a concept used to signify a group’s particular 
susceptibility to being harmed, wronged, or exploited.  Special protections are put into place 
such that the research study is conducted in accordance with established ethical standards and 
also with regard to these populations’ particular susceptibilities.  The goal is to recognize 
individuals’ potential inability to make a voluntary, informed decision due to decreased capacity 
or propensity to suffer from undue pressures, or to recognize their propensity to suffer more 
severe or more frequent harms when participating in research.  Although the special protections 
may be justified and in accordance with the ethical conduct of research, as the section below will 
explore, the current framework which governs the application of considerations of vulnerability 
inadequately offers these protections and also may cause particular harms to those who are 
members of the groups labeled as vulnerable. 
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3.0  NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND HARMS OF THE VULNERABILITY LABEL 
The special protections implemented in response to identification of a population as 
vulnerable are designed to benefit such populations and protect their interests.  While the 
safeguards do afford some benefit or protection of their interests, the safeguards and the fact of 
being labeled as a vulnerable population (or a member of a vulnerable population) may also have 
some negative consequences.  These negative consequences may arise within the research 
context or outside of it.  Being a member of a population considered to be vulnerable may reduce 
or remove one’s opportunity to make a choice to participate in research.  In some situations this 
may be appropriate; but, as I will further argue below, in some cases the label of vulnerability is 
either applied where it should not be, or rests upon exaggerated concerns regarding the 
voluntariness or competence of an individual’s decision-making and inability to protect her own 
interests.  Individuals who belong to the vulnerable populations may not only be harmed by 
sometimes blanket exclusion from research, but they may also be harmed when they are subject 
to special protections solely on account of their identity as a member of a vulnerable population 
when they in fact do not possess the worrisome characteristic or situational features which render 
other individuals in that population vulnerable.   
Other harms and negative effects of employing the concept of vulnerability as it is 
usually implemented include, as I shall argue, further disadvantaging groups that are already 
disadvantaged, and the ascription of particular characteristics to individuals who are members of 
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vulnerable populations with the result that many of their decisions may become automatically 
discounted or the people themselves may be stigmatized or disrespected.  In the research context, 
the concept is applied as a label, and it is describes the vulnerability as entirely situated within 
the individual.  There is no focus on the surrounding actors, institutions, and circumstances.  
Conceptualizing vulnerability in this way and then applying it as a label to groups of people can 
serve to promote a more global sense of lessened self-worth among individuals who are members 
of so-called vulnerable populations. 
 
3.1 THE LABEL ‘VULNERABLE’ IS INSUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC AND 
SENSITIVE, AND CREATES PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE 
In this section I argue that because the concept of vulnerability is insufficiently sensitive 
and specific, it fails to pick out those and only those who are in need of special protections.  This 
failure leads to problems of injustice. First, the way that the guidelines are formulated may lead 
to some nonvulnerable individuals being overprotected and may neglect to protect some 
individuals who actually are in need of these special protections.  The result is an injustice – 
namely, a failure to treat like cases alike, or to treat similarly situated prospective subjects 
similarly.   
Labeling entire populations is not sufficiently specific.  The Guidebook names groups, 
not individuals or characteristics, and thus can result in individuals being subject to special 
protections or excluded from participation in research who should not be.  Moreover, the way 
vulnerability is conceptualized as applying to rather easily identifiable populations (e.g., fetuses, 
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prisoners, the cognitively impaired) is insufficiently sensitive.  In other words, this approach fails 
to identify all those individuals who are particularly susceptible to harms and wrongs by their 
participation in research.  By focusing on the supposed vulnerability of groups, similarly 
vulnerable individuals who do not fall within one of the identified populations will not be 
afforded special protections.  These failures of specificity and sensitivity create an issue of 
justice; relatively similarly situated individuals are not treated alike within research regulations 
and guidance, and thus within research itself. 
The identification of vulnerable populations in research creates a system of categorization 
which uses a label which is not sufficiently specific to offer adequate protections to those human 
research subjects who truly are highly susceptible to harms or wrongs.  The categories set out in 
the Guidebook and elsewhere function to identify groups of people (“minorities,” “women,” 
“Special Classes of Subjects”) who may be more likely to possess the worrisome traits or find 
themselves in the troubling contexts which render the voluntary and informed nature of their 
decisions suspect.  Because of these broad categories, the current schema is prone to producing 
both false positives (and false negatives, which will be addressed later) when identifying those 
who are in need of added protections.  The result is both a failure to afford benefit and promote 
the welfare of prospective subjects, and cases of formal injustice.63 
Relying on broad categories is a misstep in two ways: first, it assumes that individuals in 
each of these populations share the characteristic which gives rise to the heightened 
susceptibility to harms or wrongs; and second, it assumes that individuals who are members of 
these groups will be easily identifiable as such and thus will be subject to the developed special 
protections.  While some vulnerable populations necessarily share the characteristics which 
                                                 
63 Beauchamp, Tom L., and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 6th ed. (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 242. 
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render them vulnerable (e.g., all cognitively impaired individuals lack competence to some 
degree), others do not (e.g., not all minority research participants may face language barriers).  
Moreover, even among those populations who share a characteristic, they may not share it to the 
same degree.  Cognitively impaired individuals, for instance, may still be competent to make 
some decisions, while incompetent to make others.64  Some individuals who are only slightly 
cognitively impaired may be able to provide voluntary informed consent to enroll in a research 
study if given special attention during the informed consent process; however, because of the 
way the label of vulnerability frequently works – i.e., to exclude an entire vulnerable population 
– they may sometimes be precluded from having that opportunity.   
Exclusion of a population from research is troublesome because if individuals with 
particular characteristics are systematically excluded from study, the findings of research will not 
be generalizable to them.  So, the population may not benefit from research findings.  As in the 
case of safeguards mentioned above which may involve limiting advertising mechanisms such 
that they are not taken out in free papers or placed in low-income medical clinics, the problem is 
that these studies will then tend to enroll a non-representative research sample.  The application 
of the special protections across a broad population without regard to the variations among 
individuals is also troublesome when it leads not to outright exclusion from research, but rather 
to the enactment of special protections for both the individuals who do and do not require them.  
The establishment of a special informed consent process which requires all individuals labeled 
“cognitively impaired” to undergo a special, lengthy informed consent educational session and 
                                                 
64 Competence is a relational concept; thus the answer to whether or not one is competent must depend on the 
decision being made.  An individual may be deemed competent when the decision in question is whether he would 
prefer to ride his bike to work or take the bus, but may be deemed incompetent to make a decision about whether or 
not to participate in research.  See Buchanan, Allen E., and Dan W. Brock. Deciding for Others: The Ethics of 
Surrogate Decision Making. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990): 18-23. 
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then establish their understanding by taking a quiz or performing some other action may be 
unnecessary and demeaning to those cognitively impaired individuals labeled as such but who 
did not lack the competence to undergo a more brief informed consent procedure used to enroll 
those individuals not categorized as cognitively impaired.  This, and similar other situations, are 
examples of the false positives which may occur under the current framework, especially, though 
not exclusively, where perceived vulnerability leads to wholesale exclusion. 
The current framework for addressing vulnerability can also produce false negatives.  
There are some individuals who could benefit from added protections while enrolling or 
participating in research, but who are not obviously included in or identified as members of the 
populations set out by the Guidebook.  Therefore, the current schema fails to adequately protect 
some individuals who are in need of these protections as they are susceptible to being harmed or 
wronged in the ways with which the research regulations are concerned.  This is a problem of the 
lack of sensitivity of the label.  For instance, there is no category of vulnerable populations 
which would include poor white males.  Although minorities are identified as a vulnerable 
population, and one concern listed in the Guidebook is that they may be particularly susceptible 
to facing undue pressure to participate in research due to financial motivations, there is no 
category which addresses this concern as applied to nonminority individuals.  Therefore, 
although destitute individuals of any race may possess the kind of economic motivation that 
renders the voluntariness of their decision-making suspect, they may fail to be identified under 
the current scheme.   
IRBs were meant to use the guidelines regarding vulnerable populations as a way to 
consider the ration of risks and potential benefits presented by a research study and to consider 
implementing greater safeguards in the research enrollment process and during the conduct of 
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research.  The implementation of added safeguards can help to ensure voluntary, informed 
consent is given by prospective subjects; however, when instituting these safeguards is 
predicated on the labeling of a population as vulnerable, unintended negative consequences can 
arise for prospective research subjects and for other members of the population.  If the practical 
goal of the Guidebook is to provide guidance to those involved in the decision-making process to 
avoid unduly harming or wronging particular groups, then this goal is not being met by the 
current scheme employing the label of vulnerability. 
Further, the label ‘vulnerable’ does not focus attention on the different ways in which 
various individuals are vulnerable.  The Guidebook uses categories which signify ‘vulnerable 
populations,’ not ‘characteristics which may render an individual or group vulnerable.’  For 
instance, the Guidebook lists “elderly/aged persons” as a vulnerable population.65  However, the 
concern about the particular susceptibility of members of that population to being harmed or 
wronged is not directed necessarily at the individuals’ ages.  What renders that ‘population’ 
vulnerable is the fact that many elderly may suffer cognitive impairments or be 
institutionalized.66  Therefore, the ‘vulnerability’ is expressed as a function of age across a 
population; however, the actual concern is for particular characteristics which may exist among 
the elderly, but are varied between individuals and are not a necessary feature of aging itself.  
Because a single label (‘vulnerable’) is applied to populations where the concerns are varied – a 
lack of competence, a circumstance of undue pressure, both, or even other circumstances 
rendering these groups more prone to harms or wrongs, the label fails to draw attention to what it 
is that renders a particular individual vulnerable, and thus she may fail to be offered protections.  
                                                 
65 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Chapter VI, supra note 4, at Subpart 8. 
66 Id. 
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By applying one label across all of these various situations, the true concern which justifies the 
enactment of additional protections is obscured. 
Another concern is that by labeling categories of people as ‘vulnerable,’ and by 
identifying vulnerable individuals by their characteristics which make them part of one of the 
enumerated populations, it is seemingly suggested that they would benefit from the same kind of 
protections when in reality that is not the case.  Considering the various ways in which these 
groups are vulnerable, and what they are vulnerable to, it is clear that one protection mechanism 
is not appropriate across several groups, just as a single mode of protection may not be 
appropriate across all individuals – even those who are vulnerable – within the group.  For 
instance, while a modification to the language in the consent form and the educational level at 
which that information is conveyed might be appropriate to ensure mildly cognitively impaired 
persons can give adequate, voluntary, informed consent, a simple modification of consent 
language will not necessarily serve to satisfactorily protect terminally ill patients or prisoners. 
Thus, the label vulnerable as it is currently used, employing a “subpopulation 
framework,”67 lacks specificity and may result in the over-protection of individuals who are not 
in fact vulnerable.  The label is also not sensitive enough and may result in a failure to identify 
some individuals who are in need of protections, and to adequately offer protections to those who 
do.  There are worrisome practical results from these labeling issues – populations may be 
excluded from research participation, and therefore potentially from the benefits, those who are 
not in need of protections to them, which may be demeaning and also pointless.  These two 
concerns create a problem of formal justice – relevantly similarly situated individuals in the 
                                                 
67 See, e.g., Grady, Christine. "Vulnerability in Research: Individuals with Limited Financial or Social Resources." 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 37, no. 1 (2009): 19-27.; Luna, Florencia. "Elucidating the Concept of 
Vulnerability: Layers Not Labels." International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 2 (2009): 121-139.; 
Kipnis, supra note 5. 
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research context are failed to be treated alike.  There are also other negative effects of the 
application of the label ‘vulnerable’ to populations which occur outside of the research context.  
They will be explored in the next section. 
3.2 CONCEPTUAL CONCERNS REGARDING VULNERABILITY AND THEIR 
NEGATIVE EFFECTS 
In addition to problems created within the research context by the labeling of broad 
populations as vulnerable, the concept of vulnerability itself raises conceptual and potential 
practical problems.  The way the label is defined and applied can have a number of negative 
effects on members of the populations to whom the label is applied.  First, labeling populations – 
and by extension, members of the population – as vulnerable implies that the reason for their 
vulnerability is integral to the individual and her situation and immutable.  Situating the 
vulnerability within the individual, instead of identifying it as a feature of her circumstances or in 
her relationship with others, has negative consequences that parallel those associated with 
labeling individuals as disabled.  This parallel is explored below.  Second, the labels in the 
research context do not invite anyone – researchers or others – to delve into the source of the 
vulnerability.  Therefore, it is difficult to conceptualize a solution or safeguard within the 
decision-making and enrollment processes which would address the underlying causes of 
vulnerability in order to ensure that each of these individuals has her particular form of 
vulnerability addressed, the competence of her decision-making process ensured, or the 
voluntariness of her decisions bolstered.  The combination of these two problems create a third: 
once the characteristic of the population is essentialized, the source of the vulnerability ceases to 
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be viewed as a problem capable of redress.  Once the label of vulnerability is affixed and 
essentialized, the desireability of conducting research with members of such populations ceases 
to exert pressure to address resolvable sources of vulnerability in order to enable their 
participation in research.  The underlying source of the vulnerability – e.g., poverty or illiteracy – 
gains no support for redress from the research enterprise.   
The way that the IRB Guidebook and other research regulations treat human subject 
protections for vulnerable populations tends to ascribe the vulnerability to the individual, as part 
of herself and her situation; an immutable characteristic and a deficiency.  By listing classes of 
people, (e.g., “women,” “prisoners,” “elderly/aged persons”), the guidelines are identifying those 
individuals who are members of a questionably identifiable population as vulnerable.  This label 
does not speak to the source of the vulnerability.  The guidelines could identify various sources 
of vulnerability, or various circumstances which might bring about undue pressure or heighten 
susceptibility to being harmed or wronged.  For instance, the guidelines could articulate a need 
for heightened protections in studies enrolling participants where the participant population is 
particularly prone to coercion from an authority figure or individual who has control over them.  
Or the guidelines might suggest that additional safeguards be enacted when enrolling subjects for 
a study where the potential subject population is particularly prone to undue pressure because of 
economic circumstances (perhaps the study protocol has some sort of requirement which would 
overwhelmingly exclude the enrollment of participants with steady full-time jobs). 
Instead, the Guidebook focuses on the populations of individuals who might be likely to 
face undue pressure, a lack of competence, or a particular susceptibility to being harmed or 
wronged.  This naming of populations both conceptually situates a deficiency in the class of 
individuals named, and also suggests that the solution be applied to that class of individuals as 
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opposed to modifying the surrounding circumstances or actors.  For instance, one of the concerns 
about the use of prisoners as human subjects is the issue of whether or not “confidentiality of 
participation and of data can be adequately maintained in the prison.”68  Prisoners, while being 
‘vulnerable’ in the definitional sense because they are facing a heightened susceptibility of being 
harmed and/or wronged by a breach of confidentiality, are not vulnerable because of any 
characteristic that is integral to each of their individual beings.  The Guidebook and behavior of 
IRBs, however, apply protections to that class of individuals by speaking of them as ‘vulnerable’ 
and by restricting their opportunity to participate in studies, rather than addressing the insecurity 
of confidential study information to enable them to participate without incurring heightened risk. 
When a population is identified as vulnerable, modifications may take place in the study 
protocol, but those modifications are generally implemented by affecting the opportunity or the 
ability of individuals who are members of the named vulnerable population to give consent to 
participate in the study.  Whether the protection is in the form of a modified consent form, a 
refusal to enroll members of that population, or simply heightened scrutiny during the decision-
making process for members of the identified population, the net effect is always on their ability 
to give consent to participation in research by which others will abide.  It is not suggested, for 
example, that prisoners be permitted to enroll in a study once the data-keeping methods of the 
prison are bolstered.  Other issues are less clear, but ultimately it tends to be the case that the 
additional safeguards are directed in a way that impacts the populations’ opportunity or ability to 
give consent and enroll in the research study.  For instance, monetary compensation is discussed 
under the heading of ‘students, employees, and normal volunteers.’69  The Guidebook reads:  
                                                 
68 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Chapter VI, supra note 4, at Subpart E. 
69 Id., at Subpart 10. 
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In research involving normal volunteers, particularly where the research involves more 
than minimal risk, IRBs must ensure that any monetary payments to subjects are not so 
great as to constitute an undue inducement.  This issue may be particularly difficult for 
IRBs to deal with.  Since subjects who volunteer to participate in such studies are usually 
compensated for their time and discomfort, IRBs should seriously scrutinize the payment 
schedules to ensure that any compensation offered is commensurate with the time, 
discomfort, and risk involved.  Even so, where a research procedure involves serious 
discomfort and/or the real, though slight, possibility of serious harm (e.g., studies that 
involve the insertion and positioning of catheters in veins or the heart), one can easily 
imagine that the motivation of persons who volunteer to participate may be monetary.  
IRBs should pay particular attention to the proposed study population and whether or not 
it may comprise persons who are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence, 
such as persons who are educationally or economically disadvantaged.  The federal 
regulations require that IRBs employ special safeguards under such circumstances.70 
 
Essentially, the Guidebook does note that monetary compensation must be reviewed for each 
study to ensure that it is appropriate and commensurate with the time and risk the study involves; 
monetary payments should act as reimbursements to the subjects but should not be so great as to 
become inducements.71   
There are, however, some studies where the monetary value of these individuals’ 
participation is great because the time and risk involved in study participation is great.  In these 
cases, the monetary payment for participation cannot necessarily be lessened and still be fair.  
However, in such cases a large payment may become an undue inducement to those populations 
who are economically disadvantaged.  Under these circumstances (the compensation is 
justifiably large and must not be reduced, and the study may attract economically disadvantaged 
applicants), the safeguards are again directed toward, and have an impact on, the ‘vulnerable’ 
population and their ability to participate in the study by giving informed consent.  For instance, 
in one chapter of The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics which discusses research 
involving economically disadvantaged participants, it is noted that poor individuals can be 
                                                 
70 Institutional Review Board Guidebook, Chapter VI, supra note 4, at Subpart 10. 
71 Amdur, Robert J., and Elizabeth A. Bankert, Institutional Review Board Member Handbook. Jones & Bartlett 
Publishers, Inc. 2007. 
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vulnerable to undue financial inducements but should not be considered, on that basis alone, 
incapable of making decisions which protect their own interests.72  However, the suggestions for 
added safeguards that may be considered when this population may enroll in research include 
limiting recruitment of economically disadvantaged individuals to only minimal-risk studies, 
applying “special scrutiny” to the decisions of economically disadvantaged individuals to 
participate in research, careful development and heightened monitoring of the informed consent 
process, and changing the setting of research such that economically disadvantaged individuals 
would be less likely to enroll or more likely to receive better attention.73  All of these suggested 
special protections impact the ability of the economically disadvantaged to give consent to 
participate in research. 
The way the label of ‘vulnerability’ is applied tends to suggest that the vulnerability 
which impairs the capacity to make decisions, undermines their voluntariness, or makes the 
individuals more susceptible to harms or wrongs, is somehow essential and immutable – integral 
to the individual and her situation, and unable to be changed.  The conceptualization of 
vulnerability in this way can raise conceptual concerns which parallel much of the discourse 
surrounding the definition of “disabled” individuals, and the social construction of disability.  In 
this context, some argue that the way disability is defined and conceptualized situates the 
deficiency entirely within the individual and fails to acknowledge that many or most of the 
disadvantages and limitations experienced are the result of the relationship between the disabled 
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individual and her social and physical environment.74 While some features of the individual’s 
disability may indeed be biological facts and thus unalterable – e.g., blindness, deafness, or 
impaired mobility – features of the environment might be altered to eliminate or reduce the 
disabling result.  Furthermore, the way disabled people are thought of and defined contrasts the 
individual’s abilities against a “normal” scale, which may seem to reinforce the disrespectful 
implication that there are two classes of citizens: the normal and the less-than-normal.75  In much 
the same way, the definition of vulnerability and the way that vulnerable individuals are 
currently identified fails to situate the deficiencies within the consent process and its broader 
social context; rather, the label ascribes to individuals a particular label or status noting their 
inability to participate in the consent process and make truly voluntary or competent decisions to 
enter into contracts or safeguard their own wellbeing against the possibility of harms or wrongs.  
In the case of vulnerability that does not affect individuals’ abilities to give informed consent, 
but is associated with other concerns about research participation, the criticism is similar.  
Instead of conceptualizing the heightened risks these individuals face by participating in research 
as a result of features of the research institution itself, the vulnerability is connected to that 
feature of the individual which causes them exposure to the heightened level of risks.  
 The theory of the “social construction of disability” argues that disabled individuals are 
disabled less by the biological facts of their bodies and more by the social and cultural context in 
which they find themselves.76  Definitions of disability are informed by a particular society’s 
attitudes and expectations about the abilities of individuals and what it considers “normal” in 
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terms of abilities and performance.77  The definition of the disability, and also its severity, are all 
constructed by social and cultural constraints and norms, rather than by particular facts of 
biology.78  Furthermore, although there are some valid practical reasons to define which 
individuals are ‘differently-abled’ – we can offer protections and opportunities which address 
limitations otherwise placed upon them – some argue that there are other agendas behind 
defining “disability,” particularly in the way that it is currently done.79  If the only reason for 
defining disabled people was to offer them accommodations or protections, there would be no 
category of “disabled people;” everyone’s abilities would be considered and everyone would be 
offered these protections and accommodations that would permit them to develop their full 
potential and be fully participating members of society.80  The category of “disabled individuals” 
as it is currently defined and applied is both fails to identify everyone who is in need of these 
protections or resources and fails to identify what protections are needed.81 
 A similar argument can be made about the label of ‘vulnerability.’  The label functions 
much the same way as labeling someone as ‘disabled’ does.  It ascribes the difference in abilities 
and failures of functioning entirely to the individual.  If a disabled individual is unable, for 
instance, to open a heavy door, it is considered a feature of her disability and not a feature of 
society (i.e., the way we construct doors) which creates her inability to enter a particular room.  
If an individual is unable to give voluntary consent because she is particularly susceptible to 
undue pressure as an institutionalized elderly woman, it is not conceptualized as features of her 
situation which are causing the susceptibility, but rather her own dependence and frailty.  Also, 
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while there is some basis in fact for the need for protections of human research subjects from 
being harmed, wronged, or exploited, the categorization of ‘vulnerable populations’ does not 
appropriately define who is in need of these protections.  If the only concern was not permitting 
those who are susceptible to harms or wrongs be harmed or wronged, then the protections would 
take each individual’s interests and circumstances into account, and protections currently 
considered special would be offered to all on the basis of considering each person’s own 
susceptibilities.  Furthermore, the protections that would be offered would also be more 
customized to the particular individual’s needs – to what is rendering them more highly 
susceptible to harm or exploitation in any particular instance.   
Finally, labeling someone as ‘vulnerable’ can have the same kind of effects that labeling 
someone as ‘disabled’ does.  The label may help to define them or their identity.  The label may 
lead them to feel stigmatized, which will be discussed in the next section.   
3.3 STIGMA AND INTERNALIZED STIGMA 
 Seeming to locate the problem in the vulnerable individual leads to other ways, beyond 
the research context, that individuals are made worse-off.  Individuals who are labeled as 
vulnerable may become viewed by others as particularly weak or dependent.  Furthermore, they 
may become stigmatized by this conceptualization, which in turn could lead to a general 
discounting of their decision-making capacity and heightened scrutiny of their decisions, perhaps 
in nonresearch contexts.  They may become viewed as lesser individuals; and in instances where 
this stigmatization is so pervasive, the so-labeled vulnerable individuals may internalize this 
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view of themselves as weak or lesser and thus accept a more global sense of frailty, weakness, or 
inability to make decisions which protect their interests.      
Being vulnerable implies weakness, frailty, and dependence.  Ascribing these 
characteristics to individuals is potentially demeaning and stigmatizing.  Because the 
vulnerability framework in research protections situates the vulnerability within the individual 
subject, not relationally or situationally, being identified as vulnerable reifies and essentializes 
the condition of vulnerability making the trait of vulnerability more real and immutable than it 
may actually be. 
Within American society, vulnerability may be particularly stigmatizing. 82  There is a 
particular stigma that attaches in this society to individuals who are seen as weak or dependent.  
Being unable to “pull oneself up by the bootstraps” or “make it through” on one’s own creates an 
attitude of disdain among others.  One of the reasons that being vulnerable is so negatively 
stigmatizing is that people tend to engage in what Iris Marion Young terms “dyadic thinking.”83  
Dyadic thinking conceptualizes social relations in terms of power relations between dominant 
and subordinate groups.84  The label of “vulnerable” creates an “Other.”85  The label sets up a 
dyadic relationship – an “us” and a “them.”86  Those in the dominant group oppress – at least in 
their own minds, if not in fact or action – the subordinate groups, judging those individuals as 
different and inferior.87  Not only are the Others deemed different and inferior, but their 
experiences and worldviews tend to be discounted.88  Because those in the dominant majority 
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have greater control over social goods and tend to dominate the creation of norms and culture, 
the experiences of the Others in a society are discounted because they do not conform to the 
prevailing cultural norms and experiences.89   When this occurs, these vulnerable Others may be 
ultimately viewed negatively by those in the majority in contexts completely removed from the 
initial setting that originated the label, in this case, research, or other decision-making contexts in 
which the label of vulnerability is applied.  Because of the value placed on being independent 
and capable in this society, in virtue of dyadic reasoning, the state of being vulnerable presents a 
particular threat.  The label prompts a more global sense of lessened worth of the so-called 
vulnerable individual.  Being labeled as vulnerable, then, creates this stigma and is potentially 
harmful to those labeled as such. 
 Moreover, if a condition is sufficiently stigmatizing – that is, if a condition results in 
substantial shunning and disrespect by others – a person with that condition may internalize the 
stigma and come to think of herself as a lesser individual.  The label of ‘vulnerable’ as it is 
ascribed to entire groups may be alienating or dehumanizing for those who have never felt 
vulnerable or particularly prone to exploitation by virtue of their membership in that group.  
Being defined as a member of a vulnerable population may serve to inform and distort an 
individual’s perceptions of her own experiences and self-worth.  In other words, the external 
stigma enacted by the “normal” in society may then become internalized by the individuals who 
are labeled as vulnerable.  Those who are labeled as the “Others,” who are stigmatized by their 
perceived deficiency or shortcoming from which they must be protected, may then internalize 
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those negative stereotypes of themselves and begin to enact them or exhibit them where before 
they had not.90 
 Some evidence of this internalization, acceptance, and enactment of these characteristics 
associated with the label of vulnerability may be extrapolated from the social science literature 
regarding self-fulfilling prophecies.91  Self-fulfilling prophecies occur when social beliefs lead to 
their own fulfillment; individuals become aware of a belief and adopt behaviors which conform 
with it.92  The actions and behaviors of the stigmatized individual, in turn, serve to justify and 
maintain the initial stigmas.93  Those who are stigmatized by being labeled as vulnerable may 
begin to enact behaviors and exhibit characteristics of weakness, frailty, and an inability to 
protect their own interests.  The traits of the stigma become reified and the stereotypes are 
reinforced. 
 Although there may be sufficient stigma attached to members of many of these 
vulnerable populations (e.g., women, minorities, the elderly) in virtue of their membership in 
these historically stigmatized groups, the further labeling and stigmatizing associated with 
vulnerability is still troublesome.  The stigma associated with vulnerability may serve to 
reinforce the stigma that these groups already experience.  The reinforcement of the 
stigmatization of these social groups, further reinforced through self-fulfilling prophecies, is 
particularly troubling when the stigma is imposed by the research context.  The stigma of being 
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vulnerable would be imposed and supported by a publicly-funded institution meant to serve the 
benefit of the population.  Individuals labeled as vulnerable in the research context, then, face an 
institutionalized reinforcement of the stigma, which may then serve to reify, justify, and allow to 
be perpetuated the stereotypes associated with vulnerability. 
 These negative implications and harms of being labeled as vulnerable stem from the 
conceptualization of vulnerability upon which the research protections rest, along with the 
framework the research regulations adopt for applying such protections.  While it is important to 
offer protections that ensure that individuals’ rights and interests are protected while 
participating in research, the current scheme of implementing such protections is inadequate to 
appropriately address the vulnerabilities of various individuals and, furthermore, causes 
particular harms simply by its application.  In the following section, an alternative framework for 
assessing vulnerability is considered.  However, while this alternative analytical framework 
avoids some of the problems of inaccurate identification of individuals to whom to apply special 
protections, and thus avoids some associated issues of justice, it both fails to address all forms of 
vulnerability which are worrisome in the research context and continues to rely on a 
conceptualization of vulnerability which situates it as a feature of an individual instead of within 
her context.     
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4.0  A NEW WAY OF CONCEPTUALIZING VULNERABILITY 
 There are compelling reasons to afford special protections to individuals in the research 
context, but there ought to be a way to do so which does not risk integrating the feature of 
vulnerability into their identity.  There are moral reasons not to allow exploitative transactions, 
even those which may offer some benefit to the exploitee or those to which the potential 
exploitee gives fully voluntary, informed consent.  Thus, the current framework and special 
protections should not be disposed of without offering an alternative way to protect vulnerable 
individuals.  In the following sections, I will present one alternative framework that has been 
proposed for considering individual’s vulnerability in the research context.  I argue that this 
alternative framework, while avoiding some of the problems of inadequate sensitivity and 
specificity plaguing the current framework, still continues to employ the conceptualization of 
vulnerability which renders it to be a failing of an individual.  It, in some instances, ascribes the 
characteristic of frailty or weakness to the individual herself, instead of focusing on the relational 
aspects of her circumstances or situation which render her thus susceptible to harms or wrongs.  
In other instances, the focus of the protection is misplaced; the protections are developed and 
applied to the individuals who are members of a particular subpopulation rather than applied to 
the particular features of their situation or circumstance which renders them vulnerable.  In the 
final section, I will present and argue for this more relationally-focused conception of 
vulnerability, and discuss how it may be implemented in the research context.  Although it may 
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be more difficult to implement, it ultimately will offer more appropriate and thorough protections 
to those in need, while avoiding stigmatizing and labeling individuals as unable to protect their 
own interests because of an individual failing. 
 
4.1 ONE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYING THE 
CONCEPT OF VULNERABILITY 
 In an attempt to bring some clarity to what we are truly concerned about when we term 
certain groups of people as “vulnerable,” Kenneth Kipnis has developed a taxonomy of 
vulnerabilities in which he identified the various characteristics which are the source of impaired 
consent.  In Kipnis’ schema, there are six different types of vulnerability: (1) cognitive; (2) 
juridic; (3) deferential; (4) medical; (5) allocational; and (6) infrastructural.94  Through this 
taxonomy, Kipnis hopes to provide a framework in which to better understand what we are 
trying to accomplish by offering heightened protections for vulnerable individuals and groups.  
Using these six categories based on the nature or source of people’s vulnerability, Kipnis tries to 
offer a scheme whereby vulnerable people are afforded better and more nuanced protections.  
His framework is also meant to provide protections to those who may be vulnerable but who are 
not included in the current categories of identified vulnerable populations.  Although Kipnis’s 
reconceptualization of vulnerability avoids some of the current problems critiqued above, it is 
still inadequate.  First, his treatment of vulnerability in the research context focuses solely on the 
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issue of consent and the circumstances under which individual’s consent may be defective.  
Furthermore, his schema still relies on the conceptualization of vulnerability as inherent in the 
individual.  Although his schema focuses increased attention on the source of the vulnerability, 
the vulnerability itself continues to be situated within the individual or the population as a 
characteristic of the individual or population.   
 Kipnis advances a framework for instituting protections for vulnerable individuals which 
is not based on a “subpopulation approach,”95 but rather on an “analytic approach” which 
endeavors to identify the various situations in which an individual may be rendered vulnerable 
and thus experience heightened susceptibility to harms or wrongs.96  Cognitive vulnerability 
considers whether or not the potential subject has the capacity to deliberate and decide about 
participation in a study.97  Juridic vulnerability addresses situations where an individual may be 
unable to give voluntary consent because of their subordinate position in a relationship of 
authority.98  The concern is that the consent given represents that of the dominant member of the 
relationship (e.g., a parent in a parent-child relationship) and not that of the potential subject (in 
this example, the child).  Deferential vulnerability may be a concern independently, or it may 
also occur in situations of juridic vulnerability; it represents the concern for individuals who are 
particularly susceptible to being harmed or wronged and are unable to give voluntary consent 
because they are deferential to the authority or wishes of others.99  The medically vulnerable are 
those who have a health-related condition for which there are currently no adequate treatments 
and for which their consent is rendered suspect because of the duress they feel to receive any 
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possible medical treatment that will aid their recovery.100  Allocational vulnerability addresses 
the situation of those who are lacking in some social resource that would be necessary to an 
ability to give voluntary informed consent.101  Examples of these social resources would be 
money, medical care, or education.102  Finally, infrastructural vulnerability addresses failings in 
the research infrastructure which would render individuals particularly open to heightened risk of 
being harmed or wronged.103  For instance, if a consent form asks subjects to rely on logging 
questions or complaints during the course of a study via a website, this requirement assumes the 
availability of internet access. 
 The first failing of Kipnis’s account of vulnerability is that it fails to consider the 
situation or circumstances of those who are particularly susceptible to harms or wrongs not in 
virtue of some failure in the decision-making context, but because of particular personal 
characteristics.104  Those who are HIV-positive, for instance, would be much more gravely 
harmed by a breach of confidentiality than those who are HIV-negative, and thus may be 
appropriately described as vulnerable.  Kipnis’s framework, however, fails to acknowledge this 
sort of vulnerability.    
 By focusing on the source of the vulnerability or its characterization, Kipnis’s schema 
does avoid some problems of over- and under-inclusion by defining vulnerability as based upon 
the particular feature or characteristic of the situation which renders one vulnerable, and thus, 
less often creates concerns of justice.  Because under Kipnis’s framework we are concerned with 
asking the question “how is an individual vulnerable,” it is true that those individuals who are 
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relatively similarly situated in a material sense will be treated equally.  Those who are 
vulnerable, for instance, because they experience allocational vulnerability in the form of a lack 
of money will be identified regardless of their membership in a particular subpopulation (e.g., 
poor white males will be identified as vulnerable along with poor black males), thus relevantly 
similarly situated individuals will be treated equally in terms of receiving protections for 
participating in research.   
 A failing of Kipnis’s account of vulnerability is, however, that his framework situates the 
vulnerability entirely within the individual and her inability to protect her own interests; and he 
does not address the problems that arise from conceiving appropriate responses to vulnerability 
as lying within or being focused upon the individual.  Although Kipnis’s framework 
distinguishes the situational characteristics which are the cause of concern, his schema continues 
to conceptualize vulnerability as an individual’s inability to participate in the decision-making 
process such that they may make a decision to participate in research by which others will abide.  
This approach does not remedy the aforementioned issues of stigmatization and 
conceptualization of those who are vulnerable as lesser individuals which result, although to the 
extent that vulnerability does not coincide with membership in an already stigmatized group, the 
negative consequences of the stigma associated with the vulnerability may be less. 
 Kipnis developed his analytical framework to answer the questions of what 
characteristics these vulnerable populations possess and how they render “those who possess 
them ‘vulnerable.’”105  Here, Kipnis is relying on the conceptualization of vulnerability as a 
feature of an individual.  Although he considers one’s circumstances or situation when 
developing his six types of vulnerability, ultimately the vulnerability is situated within the 
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individual so-characterized and their inability to protect her own interests in the face of these 
power inequities or deficiencies in abilities or resources.  By failing to address the type of 
concept vulnerability is, Kipnis’s framework continues to problematically situate vulnerability 
within individuals, and thus continues to stigmatize those deemed vulnerable   
4.2 SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO VULNERABILITY’S RELATIONAL FEATURES 
I suggest that vulnerability be conceptualized not as an inability to protect one’s interests 
per se, but rather as the potential for an individual’s assertion of her own interests to be 
prevented or overridden.106  This reconceptualization does not obscure the relational aspect of 
vulnerability in the way that the current conceptualization does.  Vulnerability is not an 
immutable characteristic or feature of an individual or group; rather, vulnerability exists as an 
expression of the characterization of the relationship between an individual and another or an 
individual and an institution.  In the sense that is important for this work,107 vulnerability must be 
considered only in relation to a particular relationship or context.  No one is simply ‘vulnerable’ 
with no qualifiers or other considerations.  Vulnerability, instead, ought to focus on the features 
of an individual’s circumstance or features of the institution with which she is interacting that 
cause the prevalence of countervailing interests which have the potential to be more powerfully 
expressed and more likely respected than her own.  Vulnerability ought to be conceptualized in a 
way that identifies the power imbalances and external features which render an individual at 
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particular risk of being harmed or wronged.  This focus will allow for the implementation of 
heightened protections for those who would truly benefit from them, while avoiding the 
ascription of vulnerability as a failure or defective characteristic which is a necessary feature of 
an individual.  The relational features are moved to the forefront and become more easily 
expressed and viewed as changeable and context-dependent, and as functions of a relationship 
rather than features of an individual herself. We can then address the differences among 
individuals while avoiding the stigmatization and hindrance that a label may and currently does 
cause. 
This new conceptualization would continue to recognize those who are ‘traditionally’ 
considered vulnerable, those individuals who are members of the vulnerable populations 
currently recognized by the research guidelines and who are particularly susceptible because of a 
lack of capacity, a likelihood of experiencing undue pressure, or a potential to be harmed or 
wronged more severely or more frequently.  Institutionalized elderly individuals, for instance, 
are sometimes (but only sometimes) vulnerable in the context of research participation under this 
new conceptualization because it may be that their interests are easily overridden by those of the 
researchers (if the researchers are affiliated with the institution where the elderly individual 
lives) who have greater power and influence to ensure that their interests are expressed over 
those of the institutionalized elderly individual. 
Framing the vulnerability in the context of the circumstances or other actors who may 
have greater power and override an expression of an individual’s own interest also allows for 
protections to be crafted which do not focus solely on the individual.  Taking the previous 
example, an institutionalized elderly individual is not per se unable to express or protect her own 
interests.  It is only when that expression of her interests is likely to be disregarded or overridden 
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by other actors that the vulnerability is ‘created.’  Thus, vulnerability no longer becomes a 
descriptive feature or fact of being an institutionalized elderly individual.  The vulnerability 
becomes a description of the context in which these individuals may find themselves in regard to 
making a particular decision (here, the decision to participate in research).  Special protections, 
then, can be developed in light of this characterization of vulnerability, may better serve the 
elderly individuals interests, and may allow for the crafting of more appropriate solutions which 
better protect individuals in the various situations and contexts in which they may face becoming 
vulnerable.  The protections would less likely rely on measures which may ultimately result in 
the exclusion of the institutionalized elderly individual from research, and more focus could be 
drawn to features of her situation (e.g., measures within the institution itself, measures that affect 
the investigator) which could be modified to allow for her participation and the protection of an 
expression of her interests. 
Conceptualizing the institutionalized elderly individual’s vulnerability as a feature of her 
being asked to make this particular decision in this particular context better suggests that an 
appropriate protection or safeguard be directed towards the situation in which she finds herself, 
not applied to the individual herself.  Instead of offering protections in a form which impacts the 
individual’s ability to make a decision about whether or not to participate in research, the 
solution or safeguard can be directed toward features of her situation which would cause her 
interests to be ignored or overridden.  Suggested protections, based on this conceptualization, 
may be focused on the actors within the research context, as well as structural or background 
conditions, and not on the opportunity for the individual to participate in research.   
Although this is only one brief example, it nicely illustrates how a reconceptualization of 
vulnerability will allow for needed protections to be offered in the context of research 
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participation, while avoiding harming those who are in need of such protections.  Expressions of 
individual’s interests can be safeguarded, and individuals can be better protected against 
experiencing more severe or more frequent harms or wrongs, when the protections are based on a 
theory of vulnerability which does not obscure the relational or contextual features which are 
necessary to properly consider how particular individuals are vulnerable.         
This reconceptualization would serve to address each of the critiques levied in sections 
two and three, while still allowing for the addition of protections for individuals who would 
benefit from them and whose interests may otherwise be overridden.  First, the 
reconceptualization of vulnerability would require that the identification of those who would 
benefit from special protections be based not upon membership in a class defined by social status 
or biological features necessarily, but rather upon the identification of the relevant contextual or 
societal features of each individual’s particular situation.  Secondly, the presence of the 
worrisome circumstances in any individual’s case ought to serve as a trigger for making a deeper 
inquiry about the likelihood of an expression of that individual’s interests to be overridden, not 
as grounds for her exclusion from attempting to express those interests.  Furthermore, the trigger 
ought to begin an inquiry into the types of protections that can be enacted which would address 
features of that individual’s situation, and not serve as a basis for protections which almost 
inevitably lead to her exclusion from research.  Finally, an approach to offering protections based 
upon this reconceptualization of vulnerability as relational, contingent, and context dependent 
will better address the problems associated with essentialization and reification of those negative 
characteristics associated with being vulnerable, which in turn can serve to justify and uphold the 
stigma-based stereotypes, which may be internalized.  All three of these features are an integral 
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part of a reconceptualization of vulnerability that makes progress toward adequately addressing 
the practical and conceptual problems raised in critique of the current framework.  
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
Vulnerability is conceptualized as the inability of an individual to protect her own 
interests and recognizes those who may be particularly susceptible to being harmed, wronged, or 
exploited.  In the research context, special protections are developed and extended to individuals 
who are members of particular populations which have been deemed to be vulnerable as a result 
of a lack of decision-making capacity, a particular susceptibility to undue pressures which would 
render their decisions involuntary, a proneness to suffering harms or wrongs to a greater 
frequency or of a greater severity, or a combination of these susceptibilities.  Although it is 
important to endeavor to avoid harming, wronging, or exploiting individuals in the research 
enterprise, the current vulnerability framework is inadequate in a number of ways. 
The label is not sensitive enough to adequately identify and treat equally all of those who 
are vulnerable in a particular way, which in some cases causes inadequate protection of those 
who would benefit from being protected.  It is also insufficiently specific and may impose 
special protections on those who do not need them or totally exclude them from research 
participation.  Furthermore, it also inappropriately suggests that the vulnerability is an integral 
“fact” or feature of the individual, which may lead to stigma and a general view of vulnerable 
individuals are somehow less worthy as individuals, a stigma which may then be internalized by 
the individuals so-labeled.   
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Although it is appropriate to offer protections which seek to ensure that the interests of 
individuals are adequately safeguarded and that they are not unduly harmed, wronged, or 
exploited by participation in research, the way that these protections are currently offered, and 
the way that vulnerability is used to signify a need for protections, is inadequate.  The offer of 
heightened protections in human subject research ought to be based on a different 
conceptualization of vulnerability.  Vulnerability ought to be conceptualized in a way that 
focuses on how it results from various relationships and contexts.  Individuals are not generally 
wholly vulnerable; instead, they are vulnerable in particular contexts, with respect to the 
particular decision they are making or the individual or institution with whom or with which they 
are interacting.  Starting from this conceptualization of vulnerability, research protections can be 
developed which would avoid the particular issues of justice, ascription of weakness, and 
stigmatization which are discussed above.  It is only in light of this reconceptualization of 
vulnerability that individuals can be treated differently while avoiding hindering or harming 
them on that very basis.   
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